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A significant challenge to empirically testing theories of discrimination has been the difficulty of 
identifying taste-based discrimination and of distinguishing it clearly from statistical discrimination.  This 
paper identifies taste-based discrimination through a two-part empirical test.  First, it constructs 
quantitative measures of revealed preferences, which establish that World War I created a persistent 
change in ethnic preferences that switched the status of German Americans from a mainstream ethnicity 
to an ethnic minority until the late 1920s.  Second, the paper uses this shock to preferences to identify the 
effects of taste-based discrimination at the example of traders at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  
A new data set of more than 5,000 applications for membership in the NYSE reveals that the War more 
than doubled the probability that applicants with German-sounding names would be rejected (relative to 
Anglo-Saxons). 
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Although empirical tests of discrimination have shown that minorities are disadvantaged in 
hiring decisions (e.g., Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004)
1 it has proven 
difficult to establish whether such differences result from biased preferences and thus reflect 
taste-based discrimination (Becker 1957).  Taste-based discrimination is especially hard to 
distinguish from statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow 1973; and Aigner and Cain, 
1977, Coate and Loury, 1993), where ethnicity serves as a signal for unobservable productivity 
differences.  Existing empirical tests have exploited detailed performance data on athletes (Khan 
and Sherer, 1988; Nardinelli and Simon 1990; Price and Wolfers 2008) and taken advantage of 
the ability to randomly assign players to ethnicities in experimental settings (e.g., Fershtman and 
Gneezy, 2001).
2
Applications to the NYSE provide an ideal setting for testing the effects of changes in 
ethnic preferences over time.  Traders at the Exchange have been selected by the same process 
since 1883, when the NYSE began to record detailed information on its admissions decisions.  
The NYSE also shares an important feature of the hiring process with modern-day professional 
firms:  Decisions on admissions and on price are made independently of each other.  Co-workers 
  There is, however, only limited evidence for taste-based discrimination in real-
life labor markets.  Empirical evidence is especially scarce at the level of high-level professional 
jobs, where glass ceilings still appear to obstruct the entry of minorities and women (e.g., Blau 
and Devaro 2007, Arfken, Bellar, and Helms 2008). 
This paper exploits an exogenous shift in preferences during World War I to identify 
taste-based discrimination in a high-level professional labor market, traders at the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE).  First, it shows that World War I (1914-1918) created a lasting shock 
to ethnic preferences, which effectively switched the status of German Americans from a well-
assimilated mainstream ethnicity to an ethnic minority.  Quantitative measures of revealed 
preferences show that this change in preferences persisted until the late 1920s, nearly a decade 
after the end of the war.  The second part of the analysis takes advantage of this persistent 
change in preferences to identify the effects of taste-based discrimination at the example of 
applicants to the NYSE. 
                                                 
1 Goldin and Rouse (2000) show that gender discrimination limits the hiring of female musicians in major 
orchestras.  Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) find that applicants with black-sounding names are less likely to be 
invited for job interviews. Charles and Guryan (2008) show that wage differentials between black and white workers 
are larger in more racially integrated states. 
2 See Kahn (1991 and 2000) for comprehensive surveys of this literature, and List (2004) for an empirical study of 
both types of evidence.  More recently, empirical tests have used data on television game shows, such as the 
Weakest Link, to identify bias against minorities, the elderly, and women (e.g. Levitt 2004).   2 
select applicants based on personal characteristics, while applicants negotiate the price of 
admissions with a current member who wants to leave the Exchange.
3
The empirical strategy uses this persistent change in tastes to estimate a simple 
difference-in-differences regression of admissions decisions on ethnicity variables, time 
variables, and controls.  Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), the analysis uses names as 
a proxy for ethnicity, such that German Americans are defined as U.S. citizens with German-
sounding names.
    
World War I created a shock to preferences that allows me to identify taste-based 
discrimination in applications to the NYSE.  Three quantitative measures of revealed preferences 
establish that the war created a persistent shock to ethnic preferences.  The first measure is 
constructed from the program notes of nearly 2,000 performances at the Metropolitan Opera in 
New York.  These data reveal that the share of operas by German-language composers fell from 
50 to less than 10 percent at the beginning of the war, and did not recover until the late 1920s.  
The second measure is constructed from the names of newborn boys in the U.S. Census.  These 
data show that the frequency of German-sounding names dropped dramatically after the 
beginning of the war.  The third measure relates to the consumption of ethnic foods.  It reveals, 
for example, that the consumption of sauerkraut declined to almost zero after the beginning of 
the war, and that hamburgers were advertised as “liberty steaks” until the late 1920s. 
4
A natural concern with the empirical strategy is that World War I lowered the real or 
perceived productivity of Americans with German-sounding names.  For example, German 
  Detailed data on veto votes and on rejection rates for more than 5,000 
applications between 1883 and 1936 show that applicants with German-sounding names 
(compared with Anglo-Saxons) were twice as likely to be rejected while the preference shock 
persisted.  In regressions of rejection rates on ethnicity variables and a variety of controls, 
interaction terms between World War I and German-sounding names are consistently large, 
positive, and significant.  Jewish applicants with German-sounding names are also affected by 
the shock to preferences.  At the same time, the data show no significant effect of the war on 
other, non-German ethnic groups.   Results are robust to controls for stock market conditions 
through time-fixed effects.   
                                                 
3 Another setting that shares key features with the NYSE’s process of admissions is the sale of apartments in co-
operatively owned buildings: Prospective buyers negotiates price directly with a current owner, but the sale is 
conditional on the approval of a co-op board, which represents the interests of other owners. 
4 For example, U.S. baseball legend Lou (Ludwig) Gehrig would be counted as German American.   3 
Americans may have been feared as a security threat during the war.  Alternatively, their 
productivity as NYSE traders may have been compromised by the war, if they were more 
dependent on business with Europe.  Productivity effects, however, cannot explain why the 
effect on rejections persisted throughout the 1920s.  Instead, the timing of changes in admissions 
matches the war’s lasting effects on ethnic preferences.   
As an additional informal test for productivity effects, I examine declassified records of 
the Bureau of Investigation (today’s FBI) and archival sources at the NYSE.  Such sources yield 
little evidence that German Americans were more affected by the war than other traders.  FBI 
documents show that no German American members were suspected of unpatriotic activities 
between 1908 and 1921, while members of other ethnicities were implicated.  Trading records 
from the NYSE archive similarly reveal that German Americans were no more likely to conduct 
foreign business than were other traders.  A variety of additional validity tests bolster the paper’s 
main findings.  For example, there is no evidence that German Americans were more likely to 
fail in business during World War I than were other Germans, and the war had no significant 
effect on applications by German American traders.   
Despite significant effects on admissions decisions, the NYSE data yield no evidence that 
German Americans paid higher prices to enter the Exchange.  This difference in impact is most 
likely to arise from the institutional characteristics of NYSE’s process of admissions.  Minority 
applicants negotiate the price of admissions with traders who want to leave the Exchange.  It is, 
however, a committee of remaining traders, and not the exiting trader, who decide on each 
admission.  These remaining traders do not benefit from higher prices, but, if he is admitted, they 
expect to interact with the applicant for many years.  Thus, institutional characteristics of the 
NYSE’s admissions process does not allow applicants to compensate future co-workers, who are 
most affected by their personal traits, for biased preferences.  Selection processes that share this 
feature of the NYSE’s admissions process may help to explain the persistence of glass ceilings in 
high-level professional jobs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I presents three alternative 
measures of revealed preferences to measure the strength and persistence of the war’s effects on 
ethnic preferences.  Section II describes the NYSE’s process of admissions.  Section III 
introduces the data on admissions and on ethnic-sounding names.  Section IV presents empirical 
results from difference in differences tables and logit regressions of rejection rates on ethnicities   4 
and controls.  Section V examines evidence on productivity along with other robustness checks.  
Section VI presents regressions for seat prices and section VII concludes. 
 
I. World War I as a Shock to Preferences 
  Historical evidence suggests that German Americans were well-integrated in the United 
States before the war 
Repeatedly, older Americans praised them as law-abiding, speedily assimilated, and strongly 
patriotic….In 1908, a group of professional people, in rating the traits of various immigrant 
nationalities, ranked the Germans above the English and in some respects judged them superior to the 
native whites. (Higham 1998, p.196) 
 
When Germany attacked neutral Belgium on August 4, 1914, however, news of German 
atrocities began to arrive in the United States.  
Towns were sacked and burned, homes were pillaged; in many places portions of the population, men, 
women, and children, were massed in public squares and mowed down by mitrailleuses, and there 
were countless individual instances of an amazing and shameless brutality… children were shot down, 
by military order, in cold blood.… infants in their mothers' arms were shot down without mercy 
(Letter of Brand Whitlock, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium to the Secretary of State, 12 September 1917, 
in Horne, 1923) 
 
In response to such news, respect for German Americans gave way to hostility.  On April 5, 
1918, The St. Louis Globe-Democrat reported the lynching of Robert Praeger: “German Enemy 
of U.S. hanged by mob.”
5
Mothers lobbied to prohibit German lessons, and in 1919, it became illegal to teach German in 
Ohio, Iowa, and Nebraska (Wittke 1936, pp.179-190).  These prohibitions remained in place 
until 1923, when the Supreme Court ruled them to be unconstitutional (Meyer vs. State of 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 1923).
  Milder types of abuse, including tarring and feathering, occurred 
dozens of times.  Frank Brocke, a German American farmer, recalls  
I would say you suffered more for the fact if you were of German descent more than anything else 
(sic). …It was just that there was a lot of hatred against the Germans and if you were German, you 




                                                 
5 Hickey 1969.  Also see Chicago Daily Tribune (April 5, 1918) and New York Times (April 4, 1918).   
6 The war’s effect on the use of the German language persisted well into the 1920s.  In 1916, 13,800 students studied 
German in Cincinnati; by 1917, this number had fallen to 7,000.  Germans were barred from many social clubs that 
they had previously dominated.  In New York, the Chemists’ Club, the Lamb Club, and the New York Athletic Club 
expelled all German-born members, and banned the use of German on their premises (New York Times, April 11, 20, 
and May 5, 1918).   
     5 
 
A. The Share of German-language Operas at the Met 
  Quantitative measures of ethnic preferences make it possible to assess the strength and 
persistence of such changes in tastes.  The first measure counts the share of operas by German-
language composers.  In the early years of the 20
th century, German-language composers 
dominated the repertoire of the Metropolitan Opera (Figure 1).  In 1910, 19 in 44 operas were by 
German-language composers.
7  Nine of these were by Richard Wagner, with strong Germanic 
themes, including Lohengrin, Tannhäuser, and Tristan und Isolde.  From 1910 until early 1917, 
half of the Met’s operas were German.  In 1917 however, the share of German-language operas 
declined from 9 in 10 operas prior to the declaration of war to 4 in 33 afterwards.  This change is 
especially dramatic considering that it can take several years to prepare an opera.
8
Opera data also confirm the observation of social historians, that World War II did not 
have a similar effect on German Americans in the United States.  Historical accounts indicate 
that U.S. enmity during World War II focused on Asia, and that, at the time, Americans 
perceived Japan as more atrocious than Germany (e.g., Dower 1996, p. 169).   Changes in the 
share of German opera are consistent with this observation; after a small drop in 1939, the share 
  In fact, 2 of 
the 4 German-language operas, Wagner’s Meistersinger and Tristan und Isolde, were performed 
within a week after the declaration of war.  In 1918, only 3 in 40 operas were by German 
composers.   
  Recitals of German-language music continued to decline for several years after the 
Armistice on November 11, 1918.  In 1919, only 7 percent of the Met’s repertoire featured 
German-language composers.  Shares stayed low, at 10 percent in 1920, 12 percent in 1921, and 
13 percent in 1922.  It took until 1923 for the share of German operas to recover to 25 percent of 
the Met’s repertoire.    
                                                 
7 Data are collected from historical schedules of performances in the online archives of the Metropolitan Opera in 
New York.  German composers include Carl Maria von Weber, Engelbert Humperdinck, Friedrich Handel, Friedrich 
von Flotow, Giacomo Meyerbeer, Hermann Goetz, Jacques Offenbach, Ludwig van Beethoven, Max von Schillings, 
Peter Cornelius, Richard Strauss, and Richard Wagner.  German-language composers further include Austrian 
composers Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Ernst Krenek, Franz von Suppé, Johann Strauss Jr. and Franz Schubert and 
the Bohemian Christoph von Gluck.  Composers are assigned to ethnicities based on their country of birth, which 
means that Beethoven and Handel are counted as German, even though Beethoven was also active in Vienna and 
Handel in London.  Multiple performances of the same opera are counted as one.  In addition to opera houses, 
concert halls and radio stations also avoided German music, and musicians who performed German pieces risked 
violent protest (New York Times, October 3 and 19, 1919). 
8 E.g., New York Times, January 20, 2008, citing Opera America.  The librettos of the two remaining German 
operas, Gluck’s Iphigenie and Flotow’s Martha, were translated into Italian.     6 
of German-language operas continues to increase and reaches 46 percent of the Met’s repertoire 
in 1945 (Figure 1).
9
B. Newborn Boys Named Wilhelm or Otto 
  
 
  Another measure of ethnic preferences can be derived from naming practices, which have 
been found to reflect attitudes towards ethnicities (Lieberson 2000).  To construct these data, I 
count newborn boys named Otto or Wilhelm between 1910 and 1919 (United States Census 
1920).  Both Otto and Wilhelm have strong ethnic connotations: Otto von Bismarck was 
Prussia’s Prime Minister from 1862 to 1890 and German Chancellor from 1867 to 1890.  
Bismarck’s namesake was Otto I, King of the Germans from 936 to 973, who was succeeded by 
a long line of Ottos.  Wilhelm II was German Emperor at the beginning of the war; he had 
succeeded his grandfather Wilhelm I (1797 – 1888) to the German throne.   
  U.S. census data show that the number of newborn boys named Otto and Wilhelm 
declined sharply after 1914 (Figure 2).  From 1915 to 1916, Otto dropped by 34.7 percent, from 
2,133 to 1,394, and Wilhelm declined by 35.0 percent from to 140 to 91.  At the same time, the 
number of boys named William, as the English equivalent to Wilhelm, increased by 3 percent 
from 2,269 to 2,345.
10
C. Ethnic Foods 
   
 
  Data on the consumption of ethnic foods yield additional evidence for a persistent change 
in ethnic preferences.  U.S. consumption of sauerkraut – a traditional German dish of fermented 
cabbage – declined by 75 percent between 1914 and 1918, causing New York’s grocers to 
complain that “There is enough sauerkraut in stock at the present time to feed a good-sized 
German army” (New York Times, April 25, 1918, p.10).
11
                                                 
9 Music historians similarly observe that “The War – in marked contrast to World War I – has not interfered with the 
production of opera in German.  One of the marked highlights of last season was the complete presentation of 
Wagner’s ‘Ring,’ so successful that the whole circle had to be repeated.” (Heinsheimer 1945, p.8) 
10 As a further robustness check, I have compared the number of boys named Heinrich and Henry in the U.S. Census 
of 1910, 1920, and 1930.  These data confirm the results for Wilhelm versus William. While the number of 
Heinrichs declines between 1910 and 1920 and recovers only after 1920, the number of Henrys continues to increase 
during World War I.   
11 Reports made to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics confirm this drop in the production of sauerkraut.  
Production by large manufacturers dropped from 124,849 tons in 1917 to 116,500 tons in 1918 to 47,900 tons in 
1919, 67,100 tons in 1920, and 64,900 tons in 1921 (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1928, p.3). 
  As late as 1928, the Department of 
Agriculture found it necessary to argue that sauerkraut was not of German origin: “It is known to   7 
have been made at an early date in Alsace, now a part of France, and also in Holland, where the 
manufacture of sauerkraut is still an important industry” (United States Department of 
Agriculture 1928, p.1).  Pretzel manufacturers similarly argued that pretzels originated in an 
Italian cloister, and cheese merchants demonstrated that limburger came from Belgium (Wittke 
1936, p.186).  Other ethnic German foods were renamed to rescue sales.  Butchers marketed 
hamburgers as “liberty steaks” throughout the 1920s.
12
II. The NYSE’s Process of Admissions 
   
  Thus evidence from opera performances, baby names, and ethnic foods indicate that the 
war created a strong shift in preferences, which persisted throughout the 1920s.  The second part 
of this paper exploits this shift in preferences to identify the impact of taste-based discrimination, 
using the example of applicants to trade at the NYSE. 
 
To trade at the NYSE, applicants apply to purchase one of 1,375 “seats.”
13
Any person, at least twenty-one years of age, and a citizen of the United States, may buy a 
membership in the Stock Exchange from any member desiring to sell, subject to the approval of the 
Committee of Admissions.  (Eames 1894, p.68) 
 
  Francis L. 
Eames, President of the Exchange from 1894 to 1898, describes the basic requirements of 
membership: 
In the first step of the admissions process, applicants negotiate a price with an incumbent trader 
who wants to leave the Exchange.  Eighty percent of all seat sales between 1883 and 1936 were 
negotiated directly between seat owners and applicants.  The remaining 20 percent were sold in 
an anonymous auction, which was administered by the Committee of Admissions.  Typically, the 
Committee stepped in for a trader who had died, failed in business, or been expelled.  Then, “his 
membership may be sold by the Committee, creditors who are members of the Exchange having 
                                                 
12 For example, the New Hotel Rosslyn in Los Angeles offered liberty steaks until 1927 (Metropolitan News 
Corporation, January 15, 2004).  Similarly, cities abandoned their German-sounding names so that Kaiser Street in 
Portland, Oregon, became Marne Way.  Berlin, Iowa, was christened Lincoln and East Germantown, Indiana, 
became Pershing (New York Times, June 2, 1918; Wittke 1936, p.184).  The circulation of German-language 
publications also decreased after 1914 even though the number of mother-tongue publications increased among 13 
major ethnic groups (Kirschbaum 1986, p.72; Wittke 1936, p.115).   
13 The first mention of the New York Stock Exchange occurred in The Diary or Loudon’s Register in March 1792.  
Only two months later, on May 17, traders agreed to deal exclusively with each other.  By 1879, the Exchange 
included 1,100 traders.  The first membership was sold in 1869 for 8,000 dollars (ca. 100,000 dollars in 2005).  
Seats within the Exchange had become saleable eight years earlier, in October 1861 (Eames 1894, pp.13, 14 and 43).  
Membership remained constant until 1929, when the NYSE granted every member the right to sell one quarter of a 
new membership during the Quarter Dividend Sale, which increased the number of seats to 1,375.  Seats became 
available for lease in 1978.     8 
a first lien upon the proceeds” (Eames 1894, p.68).
14
Typically, the Committee meets every two weeks, and interviews two to three applicants.  Each 
applicant is sponsored by two existing members who recommend him “in every way as a proper 
person to be admitted to the Exchange.”  Sponsors vouch for applicants’ financial integrity in a 
very tangible way.  They declare that they would “accept (the applicant’s) uncertified check for 
$20,000 if he were alone in business and a member of the Exchange” (Minutes of the Committee 
of Admissions 1904); this is equivalent to accepting a personal check for 2.8 million 2005 U.S. 
dollars.
 In both types of sales, the NYSE receives a 
fixed initiation fee from the buyer, which is independent of the purchase price.  This fee 
remained stable at around 20,000 year 2005 dollars.  
In the second step, the NYSE’s 15-member Committee of Admissions evaluates each 
applicant’s “personal and financial integrity” (Eames 1894, p.51).  An anonymous trader 
explains why personal characteristics matter to the applicant’s future co-workers. 
Character is essential to the Stock Exchange member.  He buys and sells in a milling, excited crowd 
around a trading post, and his contracts are oral.  None is written and he must stand by his word of 




15  At its next meetings, the Committee takes an anonymous vote.  Until 1936, ballots are 
recorded as white balls in favor of an applicant and black balls against.  An applicant is rejected, 
if more than one third of votes are black balls.
16
III. The NYSE Data 
   
 
  The data consist of 5,097 applications from January 3, 1883 when the NYSE began to 
keep detailed records of its admissions decisions, to September 24, 1936, when it stopped 
recording the black ball data.  Each observation includes the applicant’s name, the seller’s name, 
the price of the seat, the numbers of black balls and white balls, the admissions decision, and the 
date of the decision.
17
                                                 
14 I use male pronouns because there were no female applicants until 1967, when Muriel Siebert entered the NYSE. 
15 Prices are converted to real prices using nominal GDP per capita (Williamson 2007).   
16 To vote, the Committee required a quorum of 10 members.  
17 These data expand on existing data sets, which typically include only the price and the date of each seat sale.  For 
example, Schwert (1977), Jarrell (1984), Golbe (1986), Keim and Madhavan (2000), and Davis, Neal, and White 
(2007) explore the effects of trading volumes and stock prices on the price of NYSE seats. 
  The data also include annotations that reveal whether a seat was 
auctioned by the Committee of Admissions, whether a seller had died or been expelled from the   9 
Exchange, and whether a seat was transferred for a nominal price, typically within a family or 
firm.
18
  Voting data show that about three percent of all applicants were rejected across all years; 
rejection rates increased from 3 percent before the war to 4 percent during, and returned to 3 
percent afterward (Table 1).  Between 1883 and 1936, the average real price of a seat was 1.6 
million dollars.  Prices increased from 420,000 dollars in 1883 to 5.2 million dollars in 1929 and 
declined sharply thereafter (Figure 3).
  
19
B. Names as a Proxy for Ethnicities   
  
 
 Similar to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), this paper uses names as a proxy for 
applicants’ ethnicities.  Specifically, the analysis compares election outcomes for applicants with 
German-sounding names with outcomes for applicants with Anglo-Saxon names.  As a first cut, 
names are matched with ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that takes advantage of linguistic 
rules and location-specific naming practices.
20
Name data suggest that the NYSE was dominated by Anglo-Saxons throughout the 
sample (Figure 4).  In 1890, nearly two-thirds of NYSE traders were Anglo-Saxons; by 1930, 
Anglo-Saxons continued to account for half of all traders.  The share of German Americans 
increased gradually from 6.1 percent in 1890 to 7.7 percent in 1900, 7.8 percent in 1910, 8.0 in 
1920, and 8.4 percent in 1930.  The share of Jewish Americans declined from 8.6 percent in 
1890 to 7.5 percent in 1920 and 7.6 percent in 1930. 
  For example, surnames ending in “dda” or “ddo” 
are assigned to Sardinia and therefore Italy.  This algorithm creates unique ethnicity matches for 
84.2 percent of applicants.  Ethnicities are combined into four groups, German, Anglo-Saxon, 
Jewish, and Other Ethnicities, where Other Ethnicities includes the unmatched data..  German 
includes names that sound German, Austrian, and Swiss-German; Anglo-Saxon includes names 
that sound English, Scottish, and Irish.  Other Ethnicities combines Dutch, Italian, Russian 
names, along with smaller ethnic groups.  Other Ethnicities also includes Anglicized German 
names, which will make it harder to identify an effect of the war on German Americans. 
                                                 
18 The share of nominal transfers increased from 11 percent before the war, to 17 percent during, and 21 percent 
after the war (Table 1).  Since nominal transfers typically occurred within firms, they may have been subject to less 
stringent reviews by the NYSE, which will make it harder to detect discrimination. 
19 In 2005 U.S. dollars.  With the close of the market on December 30, 2005, the NYSE stopped selling seats in 
anticipation of becoming a publicly traded company.  
20 See List Service Direct, Inc. (LSDI) at http://listservicedirect.com/ethnic_religious.html for a detailed description 
of the matching algorithm.   10 
The matching algorithm combines German and non-German Jews in the Jewish variable.  
German Jews, however, may have been affected by changes in preferences.   To identify the 
potential effect on German Jews, I match each Jewish applicant with his most likely country of 
origin, based on the passenger lists of immigrant ships that arrived at the port of New York.  
Such data are available because the Steerage Act of 1819, which Congress passed in response to 
a surge in immigration after the British-American War of 1812, required captains to submit 
complete lists of all passengers and ports of origins (Page 1911).  The resulting records, 
including Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at New York, New York 1820-1897, make it 
possible to assign each Jewish applicant to his most likely country of origin.
 21
C. Potential Weaknesses of the Data  
 
For example, Arthur Schiff applied to the NYSE on December 15, 1932, and is identified 
as Jewish by the matching algorithm.  Shipping records show that 111 of 228 Schiff families 
came from Germany, 55 from Russia, 19 from Hungary, 17 from Poland, 13 from Austria, and 
13 from Hessia (which is a German state).  Thus, Jewish applicants with the last name Schiff are 
assigned to the new ethnicity variable German Jewish. 
 
  The biggest weakness of the data is that the ethnic connotation of names is a noisy and 
potentially biased measure of ethnicity.  Algorithms that assign names to ethnicities are 
optimized to match current-day naming practices; this will make it harder to detect 
discrimination between 1914 and 1929.  Expectations of discrimination may also discourage the 
use of ethnic-sounding names (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Levitt and Fryer 2004, p.770).  
Census data, compiled for this paper, have shown that the war reduced the popularity of German 
first names such as Otto or Wilhelm.  Similarly, Germans may have anglicized their last names 
to avoid discrimination.  For example, the New York Times reports that “Loyal citizens who 
possess German forms of the patronymic are striking them out” (New York Times, June 2, 1918). 
Most importantly, German American applicants with anglicized names are counted as 
Anglo-Saxon or Other Ethnicities.  This means that some applicants in the control group will also 
be affected by the changes in tastes, which imply that the estimates of the war’s effect will be 
downward biased.  For example Arthur Rittmaster applied to the NYSE in 1924 and was 
                                                 
21 Arrival records are available at ancestry.com.  Ancestry’s database combines the passenger lists of ships arriving 
at the Port of New York from 1851 to 1891 and from 1935 to 1938 with the passenger lists of vessels entering 
through Castle Garden from 1855 to 1890.   11 
rejected.  Rittmaster is an anglicized version of the German name Rittmeister, which means 
“cavalry captain.”   The matching algorithm assigns Rittmaster to Other Ethnicities, though his 
contemporaries may have recognized the name as German-sounding.   
Similarly, the German Jewish variable may be subject to measurement error if a ship’s 
port of departure differs from a family’s country of origin.  Specifically, the variable may be 
biased towards countries that are closer to the United States, and particularly towards Britain.  
For example, a ship could pick up an immigrant in Hamburg and make another stop in London 
before setting sail for the United States.  Thus, some German Jews are classified as Anglo-
Saxon, which implies that changes in tastes will also affect Anglo-Saxons.  This also implies that 
estimates of the effect of World War I will be downward biased. 
 
D. Three Time Periods: pre-War, War, and post-War 
  To examine the effect of World War I, the data are divided into three periods: pre-War, 
War, and post-War.  The pre-war period begins with the first recorded sale of a NYSE seat on 
January 3, 1883, and extends to June 28, 1914, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand was 
assassinated in Sarajevo.  The NYSE closed for business a few days after the Archduke’s death 
and remained closed until November 28, 1914.  By that time, Germany had invaded neutral 
Belgium.  In this paper, the War period is defined to include the 1920s because measures of 
ethnic preferences indicate that the war’s effect on preferences persisted through this decade.  
The post-War period begins with the first Quarter Dividend Sale on February 13, 1929.  This 
final period includes the stock market crash on Black Thursday, October 24, 1929 and the Great 
Depression.  The data end on October 1, 1936, when the NYSE stopped recording black balls.
22
IV. Changes in Admissions to the NYSE 
  
   
  Applications data show that rejection rates for applicants with German-sounding names 
nearly doubled after the beginning of the war (Table 1).  Before World War I, 4 percent of 
                                                 
22 During the war period, the NYSE faced significant competition, which is likely to have mitigated the effects of 
discrimination (e.g., Becker 1957, Higgs 1977, Fishbeck 1989, Black and Strahan 2001).  For example, the NYSE 
competed with an active curb market, the Consolidated Stock Exchange, the Coal Hole, the New York Gold 
Exchange, and the Open Board of Stock Brokers in New York, in addition to many regional exchanges (Eames 
1894, p.43).  Until 1926, the Consolidated alone held nearly a quarter of the market and employed up to 2,000 
traders (Brown, Mulherin, and Weidenmier 2008).     12 
German Americans were rejected on grounds of “personal and financial integrity.”  After 1914, 
7.7 percent of German Americans were rejected.   
 
A. Differences in Differences 
Simple two-by-two tables compare changes in rejection rates for German Americans with 
changes in rejection rates for Anglo-Saxons (Table 2).  In years between 1914 and 1929 rejection 
rates for German Americans were 3.7 percent higher than before the war, while rejection rates 
for Anglo-Saxons stayed roughly constant, with a slight decrease of 0.5 percent (Table 2, Panel 
A).  The difference across German Americans and Anglo-Saxons in these differences between 
pre-war and war rejection rates is 4.2 percent (with a p-value of 0.068), which is slightly larger 
than the pre-war rejection rate for German Americans.   
Under the assumption that the change in rejection rates for German and Anglo-Saxons 
would not have been systematically different in the absence of the war, this difference in 
differences can be interpreted as the causal effect of the war.  Thus, differences in differences 
suggest that the war more than doubled rejection rates for German Americans.    
Similarly, German Americans received on average half an additional black ball between 
1914 and 1929 compared with pre-war years, while Anglo-Saxons received slightly fewer black 
balls (a 0.459 increase for German Americans compared with a slight -0.002 decrease for Anglo-
Saxons, Table 2, panel B).  The difference across Germans and Anglo-Saxons in these 
differences across black balls after 1914 and before is 0.461 (with a p-value of 0.058).  This 
difference in differences implies that the war added about half a black ball to be cast against the 
average German American applicant.  
Equivalent tests for Jewish Germans suggest that Jewish Germans were also affected by 
the war.  Rejection rates for Jewish Germans were 6.3 percent higher after 1914 compared with 
before, while rejections rates for Anglo-Saxons stayed roughly constant (a 0.063 increase for 
Jewish Germans compared with a slight -0.005 decrease for Anglo-Saxons, Table 2, Panel A).  
The difference across Jewish Germans and Anglo-Saxons in these differences between pre-1914 
and post-1914 rejections is 6.8 percent (with a p-value of 0.016), more than double the pre-war 
rejection rates for Jewish Germans.  Jewish Germans received on average half an additional 
black ball after 1914 compared with before, while Anglo-Saxons received slightly fewer black 
balls (a 0.499 increase for Jewish Germans compared with a slight -0.002 decrease for Anglo-  13 
Saxons, Table 2, panel B).  The difference across Jewish Germans and Anglo-Saxons in these 
differences between pre-1914 and post-1914 years is approximately half a black ball (0.501, with 
a p-value of 0.089), which is almost identical to the difference-in-differences estimate for other 
Germans. 
Thus, differences in differences suggest that World War I had a substantial negative 
effect on admissions for applicants with German-sounding names.  The data also show that both 
Jewish and non-Jewish Germans were affected by changes in ethnic preferences.  OLS and logit 
regression in the next section expand on these tests by controlling for factors in addition to the 
ethnicity that may have influenced admissions. 
 
B. Regressions of Rejections on Ethnicities and Controls 
To improve on the difference-in-differences results above, regression analyses include 
additional controls for other characteristics of individual applications (Table 3).  As a robustness 
check, an extra set of the regressions include year-specific fixed effects to control for changes in 
stock market conditions and other unobservable factors, such as potentially unobservable 
changes in the admissions process of the NYSE (Tables 4).
23
 
   
 
   
In the most basic regressions, four ethnicity variables distinguish Anglo-Saxon, German, 
Jewish, and Other Ethnicities.  Anglo-Saxons are the omitted control group because they 
constitute the largest and socially dominant ethnicity.  Regressions separately estimate the effects 
of German-sounding names for years before and after 1914; the pre-1914 and post-1914 periods 
are compared with a third control period for years after 1929 when the war’s effects on ethnic 
preferences had faded.  Time-ethnicity interactions such as War * German estimate differences 
in differences over time and across ethnicities. 
 
                                                 
23 The ideal test would compare applications that were processed on the same day.  The number of transactions, 
however, is too small to allow for time fixed effects below the level of years.  Bi-annual fixed effects could compare 
a larger number of sales, but are less effective as control for stock market conditions.  Regressions with bi-annual 
fixed effects yield the same qualitative results with smaller standard errors.   14 
Regressions also control for Nominal transactions, Quarter Dividend Sales, and sales by the 
Committee of Admissions.  Intuitively, each of these variables may affect rejection rates.  First, 
nominal sales may be less likely to be rejected because such sales typically occurred within firms 
and may therefore be subject to less interference by the NYSE.  Second, the Quarter Dividend 
Sale may have increased rejection rates if the sudden increase in the supply of memberships 
lowered the quality of marginal applicants to the NYSE.  Third, rejection rates may be lower for 
sales that were administered by the Committee of Admissions if the Committee picked 
applicants that it preferred instead of selling to the highest bidder as intended by the NYSE rules.  
  Logit regressions confirm that the war had a significant effect on admissions of 
applicants with German-sounding names (Tables 3 to 6).
24  In regressions with time period 
dummies, the coefficient for the time-ethnicity interaction War * German is large and positive at 
2.0 to 2.2 (Table 3, significant at 5 percent).
   In comparison, the coefficient for pre-War * 
German stays between 1.1 and 1.3 (Table 3, not statistically significant).  These results confirm 
the findings of difference-in-differences comparisons that World War I more than doubled 
rejection rates for German Americans.  Specifically, the NYSE data indicate that the war raised 
rejection rates for German Americans from 6 to more than 13 percent.
25
Results are robust to controlling for stock market conditions and other unobservable 
changes over time with annual fixed effects: Coefficients for War * German are significantly 
larger than coefficients for pre-War * German (1.8 to 2.0 at 5 percent, Table 3).  Time-ethnicity 
interactions are not significant for any ethnicity except for applicants with German-sounding 
names.
   
26
Coefficients for the control variables yield intuitive results.  Nominal sales are 
significantly less likely to be rejected than other sales (Tables 3 to 6), confirming that the NYSE 
 
                                                 
24 Linear probability and probit regressions yield qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results; World War I 
has a strong effect on German applicants and but no effect on other ethnicities.  Data for nine years are dropped 
from regressions with annual fixed effects because no applicant was rejected in those years.   
25 Marginal probabilities are calculated from the coefficients at the sample means.  For example, the effect of being 
German on the probability of rejection is: G(βo+ βGermanXGerman+ βJewisXJewish + …  +βNominalXNominal)  - G(βo+ 
βJewishXJewish …+βNominalXNominal), where G(.) is the cumulative probability function of the logistic distribution.  
Chunrong Ai and Edward C. Norton (2003) show that these effects are approximate.  Their correction focuses on 
interactions between two continuous variables, whereas regressions in the current paper examine interactions 
between binary variables.  I use Ai and Norton’s algorithm to measure the size of the bias.  It can handle only a 
single interaction variable, and I estimate a restricted model with War*German as the only interaction variable to 
match this constraint.  In that model, differences between the approximate calculation and Ai and Norton’s corrected 
method are negligible.  
26 These results are robust to separating Other Ethnicity into more finely-grained ethnic categories, including Italian, 
Russian, and Dutch.     15 
was less likely to interfere with seat transfers that occurred within families or firms.  Applicants 
during the Quarter Dividend Sale were no more likely to be rejected than other applicants, 
suggesting that the NYSE was able to attract large numbers of quality applicants, even as it 
expanded the number of seats.
27
C. Regressions of Black Balls on Ethnicities and Controls  
  Finally, applicants in sales that were administered by the 
Committee of Admissions were no less likely to be rejected as other applicants, confirming that 
the Committee sold to the highest bidder, as intended by the NYSE rules. 
Logit regressions also confirm that both Jewish and non-Jewish Germans were affected 
by the war.  The data show that Jewish applicants faced higher rejection rates across all years 
(coefficients of 0.7 to 0.8, significant at 10 percent in Tables 3 and 4, implying rejection rates 
from 2 to 3 percent rates for Anglo-Saxons), suggesting that traders may have been biased 
against Jewish applicants as early as the 1880s, and that World War I amplified an existing bias 
against Jewish applicants.  To measure these effects, logit regressions in Tables 5 and 6 repeat 
the analysis of Tables 3 and 4, separating Jewish Germans from other Jewish applicants.  In these 
regressions, the interaction variable War * German Jewish carries a large positive coefficient 
(2.3 to 2.4, significant at 5 percent, Table 5), which implies a 19 percent increase in rejections.  
This increase is especially substantial compared with a much smaller effect for pre-war years (3 
percent based on a coefficient of 0.7 to 0.8 in Table 5, not statistically significant).  Regressions 
with annual fixed effects further strengthen these results (Table 6).  
 
  Regression analyses of black ball data confirm that changes in tastes had a significant 
effect on applicants with German-sounding names.. Ordinary least squares regressions in Tables 
7 and 8 re-estimate the logit regressions in Tables 3 and 4 with black balls instead of rejections 
as the dependent variable.  Regression results confirm the implication of difference-in-
differences comparisons that World War I added about half a black ball against the average 
German American.  Coefficients on the time-ethnicity interaction for German applicants increase 
from 0.3 and 0.4 for pre-War * German (not statistically significant, Table 7) to 0.7 and 0.8 for 
War * German (significant at 1 percent, Table 7).  Regressions with annual fixed effects further 
strengthen these results (Table 8, with an increase from 0.3 and 0.4 for pre-War * German, not 
                                                 
27 This result confirms the findings of Davis, Neale, and White (2007), which suggest that the Quarter Dividend Sale 
occurred in response to an increase in the demand for trading.   16 
statistically significant, to 0.7 for War * German, significant at 1 to 5 percent).  Separating 
Jewish applicants into German Jewish and Other Jewish indicates that black balls against 
German Jewish increase by 0.7 to 0.8 (significant at 1 percent) in regressions with time 
dummies, and by 0.6 to 0.7 (significant at 1 percent) in regressions with annual fixed effects.  
Thus, the black ball data confirm that World War I significantly worsened admissions prospects 
for both Jewish and non-Jewish applicants with German-sounding names. 
 
D. Changes in the Ethnic Composition of the Committee of Admissions 
  In addition to influencing admissions, ethnic preferences may also have limited 
promotions for German American traders within the Exchange.  To measure these effects, I 
examine changes in the ethnic composition of the Committee of Admissions.  Any observed 
effects will be gradual because rules and regulations that were in place from 1869 until the 
reorganization of the Exchange in 1938 prevented sudden changes in the ethnic composition of 
the Committee; each May, its three longest-serving members were replaced (Eames 1894, pp.74-
75).   
Committee data confirm that the war limited the promotion of German American traders 
to key positions within the Exchange; between 1914 and 1929 no German Americans (Jewish or 
not) were elected.
28  In 1880 the 15-member Committee included three German Americans and 
one Jewish trader (Figure 6).  Between 1913 and 1915, the number of German Americans 
declined to two; by 1921, only one German American remained.  It took until 1930, when 
measures of revealed preferences suggest that taste effects had faded, for another German 
American to be elected to the Committee.
29
                                                 
28 Committee members were identified from the Minutes of the Committee of Admissions (1904), Eames (1894), 
and the New York Stock Exchange Directory (1906, 1909, 1913-15, 1920, and 1930).  
29 Together with the black ball data, data on membership in the Committee of Admissions also indicate that changes 
in rejections after 1914 reflected a broad-based change in voting patterns rather changes in a small number of votes.  
During the war, only one applicant was rejected by less than a two-third majority:  On March 13, 1919, George 
Shaskan was rejected with three black balls. Shaskan does not appear to have been rejected based on his ethnicity; 
his response to the 1920 Census reveals that he had arrived from Russia in 1891, and that his naturalization was still 
pending.  
    
Thus, data on internal elections further strengthen the evidence from admissions and 
black ball data that a shift in ethnic preferences significantly worsened the prospects of 
applicants with German-sounding names.  These findings are a strong indicator of taste-based 
discrimination.   17 
 
V. Robustness Checks   
  This section presents a variety of robustness checks for the empirical results.  Most 
importantly, it examines whether significant changes in admissions might be due to changes in 
the (real or perceived) productivity of traders with German-sounding names.  For example, other 
traders may have been loath to admit applicants with German-sounding names because they were 
more likely to threaten the security of the Exchange.  Alternatively, traders with German-
sounding names may have been more likely to fail in business if they were more dependent on 
business in Europe.   
Crucially, such productivity changes cannot explain the persistence of changes in the 
treatment of German Americans throughout the 1920s.  Moreover, evidence from declassified 
FBI records and the archives of the NYSE yield little evidence that the productivity of German 
American traders was more affected by the war compared with other traders. 
  
A. No German Americans were Suspected as Spies by the FBI 
FBI case files on potential pro-German activity between 1908 and 1921 include 12 
references to the NYSE (Investigative Reports of the Bureau of Investigation 1908-1922, 
National Archives).  In only two cases existing NYSE traders were suspects of the investigation; 
more frequently NYSE members acted as informants or as witnesses for the Bureau.  One of the 
cases involved traders with an Anglo-Saxon firm, who were suspected of bribing officials to 
protect their sons from the draft (case number 8000-217574).  The other case concerned 
Frederick W. Pelzer, of B. H. & F. W. Pelzer, 12 Broadway, New York City (case number 
123,027).  Even though Pelzer was a German American, the Bureau only investigated him after 
he had applied for a passport to visit Cuba.  Following a quick background check, the Bureau 
dropped its investigation and recommended that Peltzer’s request for a passport should be 
granted. 
If the Department does not object to people traveling for pleasure only, there is no reason, as far as I 
can see, why their application for a passport should not be granted, as all information I have been able 
to get speaks very highly for both Mr. and Mrs. Pelzer." (Chief Bielaski, January 16, 1918, 
Investigative Reports of the Bureau of Investigation 1908-1922, National Archives)
30
                                                 
30 Additional evidence comes from the FBI’s list of “enemy alien firms.”  At the time, the Bureau was also 
responsible for investigating any firms were partially owned by “enemy persons”, defined as “All persons of 
whatever nationality, including partnerships and corporations, residing or doing business in the territory of enemy 
   18 
  
Thus, FBI records yield no evidence that traders with German-sounding names were more likely 
to be perceived as a security threat than were other traders. 
  
B. German Americans Traders were not more likely to do Foreign Business  
There is also no evidence that German Americans were more likely to conduct business 
with Europe, which would have made them more vulnerable to trade disruptions as a result of 
World War I.  In 1911, the NYSE created the Special Committee on Foreign Business to 
"investigate and report upon the foreign of arbitrage business and trading" (New York Stock 
Exchange, 1911).  To ensure that its traders adhered to regulations on commissions in their 
foreign transactions, the Committee gathered testimony from "every firm doing a foreign 
business at the so-called Arbitrage Rail on the floor of the Exchange" (New York Stock 
Exchange, 1911).
31
C. No Increase in Business Failures for Traders with German-sounding Names 
   
The minutes of Special Committee record that testimony was delivered by 37 members of 
the NYSE.  Only four of these traders - Benjamin W. Loeb, H.P. Goldschmidt, John D. Probst, 
and William J. Ehrich – were German Americans.  Thus, the share of German traders among 
those doing foreign business at the NYSE (11.4 percent) was only slightly higher than the share 
of German traders among the general membership of the Exchange (8 percent, Figure 4).   
 
Finally, business failures, as an extreme measure of changes in profitability, yield no 
evidence that differential productivity effects might explain the changes in admissions.  To 
protect other traders, those who failed in business were immediately expelled from the 
Exchange, and their seats were auctioned off to satisfy their creditors.  Between 1915 and 1918, 
the number of expulsions increased from zero to seven, but only two of the expelled were 
German American (Figure 7).  This share is particularly low considering that changes in ethnic 
                                                                                                                                                             
nations, or in the territory occupied by the armed forces of the enemy” (Alien Property Custodian 1919, p. 7).  This 
investigation produced a list of 286 firms with enemy interests and secured “millions of property which had been 
skillfully concealed by its enemy owners” (Alien Property Custodian 1919, p.19).  Enemy firms included two NYSE 
firms: William Schall & Co. (Report Number 7099, Alien Property Custodian 1919, p. 369) and B.F. Schwartz & 
Co. (Report Number 6737, Alien Property Custodian 1919, p. 374).  William Schall had entered NYSE a quarter 
century before the beginning of the war on April 19, 1891.  Benjamin Schwartz was accepted to the NYSE on 
February 6, 1919, with zero black balls. 
31 I thank Janet Linde at the NYSE Archives for guiding me towards the records of this Committee.   19 
preferences may have made German Americans more vulnerable to expulsion.  In fact, a second 
spike in expulsions in 1922 is most likely an effect of anti-German sentiments.  In that year, the 
NYSE witnessed six expulsions, including those of three German Americans.  At the time, 
trading restrictions with Germany had been removed, but the war’s effect on ethnic preferences 
continued to be substantial. 
Data on voluntary exits also yield no evidence that the War lowered the productivity of 
German American traders.  Such data offer a less extreme measure for a potential decline in 
productivity, as they capture traders who voluntarily resigned from trading.  Archival records 
indicate that spikes in German American exits occurred well before the war.  In 1898, the share 
of German Americans among all sellers increased from less than 9 to almost 16 percent (Figure 
8).  During World War I there was no increase in the share of German Americans.  From 1900 to 
1923 the share of German American exits fluctuated between 6 and 12 percent.  The only 
significant increase occurred in 1924, five years after the end of the war.
32
VI. Did Changes in Taste Affect the Price of Admission? 
 
In sum, archival records from the FBI and the NYSE suggest that potential changes in 
real or perceived productivity alone cannot explain differences in admissions.  The next and final 
section examines whether ethnic preferences had a similar effect on the price that German 
Americans paid to be admitted. 
 
Although admissions react strongly to changes in tastes, it is not obvious that the price of 
admissions should respond with similar intensity.  Prices were set in negotiations between 
applicants and incumbent traders who planned to leave the Exchange.  Unlike other NYSE 
traders, whose interests were represented by the Committee of Admissions, sellers only had to 
deal with a minority applicants for as long as it took them to agree on a price, and sums in the 
                                                 
32 An additional check compares applications across ethnicities and over time: If World War I lowered the 
productivity of German Americans it may have discouraged German American applicants relative to other 
ethnicities.  NYSE data, however, suggest that the share of German American applicants increased during the war, 
from 7.6 before 1914 to 9.1 percent during the war.  As a further robustness check, demographic data from the U.S. 
Census of 1920 suggest that the “quality” of German applicants – measured by age, marital status, and home 
ownership – stayed roughly constant for applicants between 1883 and 1914 compared with applicants between 1914 
and 1929.   20 
order of two million dollars were at stake.  Anti-German sentiments, however, were strong, and 
sellers may have acted on them, despite the brevity of interactions.
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To measure the effects of changes in tastes on the price of admissions, the analysis 
replicates regressions for rejection rates, with two additional controls.  A dummy variable for 
Same Ethnicity tests whether sellers favored applicants of their own ethnicity, and a dummy for 
Rejected checks whether sellers may have anticipated rejections and charged higher prices to 
compensate themselves.  As above, annual fixed effects control for stock market conditions and 
other unobservable changes in admissions over time.  
 
In contrast to data on admissions, there is only limited evidence that changes in ethnic 
preferences affected the price of admissions.  Coefficients for the variable in Table 9 indicate 
that WWI raised the price for German applicants by approximately 3 percent (11 to 14 percent 
for War * German, compared with 9 to 11 percent for pre-War * German), but this effect 
disappears in regressions that control for stock market conditions.  With annual fixed effects the 
coefficient for War * German is close to zero and not statistically significant (Table 10, pre-War 
* German is also close to zero).
34
  There is also little evidence that German sellers favored applicants of their own ethnicity.  
Without fixed effects, a coefficient of -0.13 on the interaction German Buyer and Seller * War 
implies a price reduction of 13 percent (Table 9).  This effect, however, is not statistically 
significant and disappears with the inclusion of time fixed effects.
     
35
  There is, however, some evidence that Jewish applicants paid slightly higher prices 
during World War I.  With annual fixed effects, coefficients for War * Jewish indicate that 
  Rejected applicants offer on 
average 9 percent less for a seat (Table 9), but this effect also disappears with the inclusion of 
time fixed effects (Table 10).  
                                                 
33 For example, car dealers quote higher prices to minority buyers even though their interactions are very brief (e.g., 
Ayres and Siegelman 1995).   
34 Separating German Jews from other Jews does not show a price increase for German Jews.  
35 The corresponding variable Jewish Buyer and Seller * War shows no significant effect.   21 
Jewish applicants paid a 5 to 7 percent markup during the war, which, compared with a 2 to 4 
percent markup before 1914, implies a price increase of 3 percent (Table 10).  Regressions with 
period dummies suggest a markup of 16 to 22 percent after 1914 and 5 to 12 percent before, 
which implies a price increase of 10 percent (Table 9).    
  The data also show that seats, which were auctioned by the Committee of Admissions, 
sold at a discount (nearly 13 percent, Table 9).  This discount, however, disappears with the 
inclusion of time fixed effects (Table 10).  This result is intuitive: the Committee auctioned the 
seats of traders who had died, been expelled, or failed in business.  Business failures (and 
thereby Committee sales) were more likely in poor market conditions, when seats sold for lower 
prices.
36
  The most significant price effect occurs for applicants who purchased their seats as part 
of the Quarter Dividend Sale.  In such transactions, applicants negotiated with four sellers 
instead of one.  The NYSE data show that these applicants paid on average 9 percent more than 
they would have paid in a regular sale at the same time (Table 9).
 
   
37
VII. Conclusions 
 Thus, regression results 
yield only limited evidence for taste-based discrimination in the price of admissions.  When 
traders sold their memberships, financial rewards appear to have trumped even the most 
substantial changes in ethnic preferences.  
 
Quantitative measures of ethnic preferences based on German-language operas, naming 
practices, and food purchases establish that World War I resulted in a strong and persistent shift 
in ethnic preferences, which effectively converted German Americans to an ethnic minority until 
the late 1920s.  This paper has analyzed a new data set on more than 5,000 applicants to the 
NYSE to test whether this shift in preferences affected the prospects of German Americans to 
secure a high-profile professional job.  Admissions data reveal that changes in preferences as a 
result of the war more than doubled rejection rates for Germans (relative to Anglo-Saxons). 
  Despite the strong effect on rejections, the data yield no evidence that Germans paid a 
premium to enter the Exchange.  The reason for this divergence is likely to lie in the institutional 
                                                 
36 There is no evidence that the Committee favored certain ethnicities in its own sales.  Interactions between 
ethnicity variables and the Committee of Admissions yield no statistically significant coefficients. 
37 Another interesting feature of the Quarter Dividend Sale is that, in contrast with regular sellers, Quarter Dividend 
sellers expected to trade with the applicant in the future.  The Quarter Dividend Sale, however, occurs in 1929, when 
the effect of World War I on ethnic preferences had already lost its force.     22 
characteristics of the admissions process:  An applicant to the NYSE negotiates a price with a 
member who plans to exit the Exchange.  It is, however, not the seller, but a committee of 
remaining members, who evaluate his application.  Remaining members do not benefit from 
higher prices, but they expect to trade with the applicant for many years, if he is admitted.  Thus, 
the NYSE’s admissions process does not allow applicants to compensate their future co-workers, 
who are most affected by their personal characteristic, for discriminatory preferences.   
Similar set-ups of separated decision-making are present in many labor market settings 
where co-workers may hold discriminatory tastes.  For instance, minority applicants may be 
willing to accept lower wages in their negotiations with the human resource manager of a law 
firm or investment bank, but their prospective co-workers, and not human resources, decide 
whom to admit.  Similarly, minority buyers can offer higher prices to the owner of a condo, but 
the condo board, and not the seller, decides on applications.  Across the United States, more than 
1.2 million families live in co-ops; in New York, co-ops account for 85 percent of apartments.  
Personal preferences appear to play an important role in the decisions of co-op boards, and issues 
of class discrimination have been raised in court.
38
 
  Empirical estimates from this paper suggest 
that taste-based discrimination will persist in such settings, even if regulation ensures equal 
prices and equal wages. 
More broadly, the results of this paper suggest that news of wars and ethnic violence have 
important effects on people with ethnic-sounding names.  Thus, news of atrocities like the 1995 
massacre in Srebrenica and the attacks of September 11 are likely to create significant shocks to 
ethnic preferences in the United States and other countries that are not directly affected by the 
killings.  No current-day data are available to assess the strength and persistence of such changes 
and measure their effects in labor markets.  Empirical results from this paper, however, indicate 
that changes in tastes persist long after news of atrocities come in and that the resulting changes 
in tastes create substantial effects in labor markets. 
 
                                                 
38 Most recently, an exclusive co-op on Boston’s Beacon Hill is reported to have paid 2.2 million dollars to prevent 
litigation with an Irish American cosmetics mogul, who claimed that he had been rejected because he was not a 
“blue blood.”  In response to this case, the Massachusetts State House passed a bill that would have forced co-ops to 
admit anyone who can afford to pay.  Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, however, vetoed the bill to uphold co-
ops’ right to veto sales (Boston Globe, August 31, 2008 and September 10, 2008).   23 
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TABLE 1 – APPLICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP AT THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE – SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  1883 to 1914 
(Pre-War) 
1914 to Dividend Sale 
(War) 
Dividend Sale to 1936  
(Post-war) 
All years 
         
ANGLO-SAXON         
Applications  1,207  707  1,085  2,999 
Rejected  2.9%  2.4%  2.5%  2.6% 
Nominal  11.0%  19.2%  23.00%  17.3% 
GERMAN         
Applications  149  117  169  435 
Rejected  4.0%  7.7%  1.2%  3.9% 
Nominal  4.0%  12.0%  19.5%  12.2% 
JEWISH         
Applications  147  105  173  425 
Rejected  3.4%  10.5%  5.2%  5.9% 
Nominal  10.2%  17.1%  12.1%  12.7% 
OTHER         
Applications  467  309  462  1,238 
Rejected  3.0%  5.2%  3.5%  3.7% 
Nominal  11.3%  13.9%  18.8%  14.8% 
         
ALL ETHNICITIES         
Applications  1,970  1,238  1,889  5,097 
Rejected  3.0%  4.3%  2.9%  3.3% 
Nominal  10.5%  17.0%  20.7%  15.9% 
Notes: Data on the identities of applicants and admissions decisions were collected from the NYSE Archives.  Names were matched to ethnicities 
by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.   
   2 
TABLE 2 – MEANS OF REJECTION RATES AND BLACK BALLS BY ETHNICITY, PRE-WAR VERSUS WAR 
   
  Panel A: Rejections 
 
  Panel B: Number of Blackballs 
 
  Non-Jewish German  Jewish German    Non-Jewish German  Jewish German 
  War  Pre-War  Difference  War  Pre-War  Difference    War  Pre-War  Difference  War  Pre-War  Difference 
German American  0.077  0.040  0.037  0.087  0.024  0.063    0.966  0.507  0.459  0.809  0.310  0.499 
  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.027)    (0.170)  (0.150)  (0.230)  (0.210)  (0.190)  (0.280) 
Anglo-Saxon  0.024  0.029  -0.005  0.024  0.029  -0.005    0.317  0.319  -0.002  0.317  0.319  -0.002 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008)    (0.070)  (0.050)  (0.980)  (0.070)  (0.050)  (0.080) 
Difference  0.053  0.011  0.042  0.063  -0.005  0.068    0.649  0.188  0.461  0.492  -0.010  0.501 
  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.028)    (0.180)  (0.159)  (0.240)  (0.220)  (0.196)  (0.290) 
Notes: German American refers to all U.S. citizens with German-sounding names.  Names are matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that takes 
advantage of linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  This algorithm groups Germans Jews together with other Jewish Americans.  German 
Jews may, however, be subject to the same bias as other German Americans.  To identify German Jews, I have assigned Jewish applicants to a country of 
origin based on the most frequent country of origin for immigrants with their last name.  Standard errors in parentheses are based on a linear probability 
regression of rejection probabilities on ethnicities.  The p-value for the difference in differences in rejection rates is 0.068 for non-Jewish German Americans 
and 0.016 for Jewish German Americans.  The p-value for the difference in differences in blackballs is 0.058 for non-Jewish German Americans and 0.089 for 
Jewish German American.  Data on admissions decisions were collected from the NYSE Archives.  3 
TABLE 3 – LOGIT REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH TIME DUMMIES: COEFFICIENTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR REJECTED APPLICANTS, 0 FOR ACCEPTED 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
German   -0.723  -0.788  -0.785  -0.787  -0.757 
   [0.739]  [0.738]  [0.738]  [0.738]  [0.738] 
Jewish   0.721  0.674  0.673  0.679  0.766 
   [0.397]+  [0.395]+  [0.395]+  [0.395]+  [0.394]+ 
Other Ethnicity   0.353  0.31  0.313  0.307  0.341 
   [0.324]  [0.322]  [0.322]  [0.321]  [0.321] 
Pre-war  0.017  0.112  0.124  0.061  0.157 
   [0.333]  [0.330]  [0.330]  [0.260]  [0.260] 
Pre-war * German   1.292  1.071  1.073  1.075  1.097 
   [0.876]  [0.865]  [0.865]  [0.865]  [0.864] 
Pre-war * Jewish   -0.27  -0.519  -0.514  -0.521  -0.601 
   [0.643]  [0.627]  [0.627]  [0.627]  [0.626] 
Pre-war * Other Ethnicity   -0.14  -0.279  -0.276  -0.27  -0.306 
   [0.468]  [0.455]  [0.455]  [0.454]  [0.454] 
War  -0.127  -0.02  -0.004  -0.067  -0.035 
   [0.378]  [0.374]  [0.373]  [0.314]  [0.313] 
War * German   2.163  1.958  1.95  1.951  1.975 
   [0.861]*  [0.852]*  [0.852]*  [0.852]*  [0.851]* 
War * Jewish   1.117  0.881  0.876  0.87  0.792 
   [0.581]+  [0.565]  [0.565]  [0.565]  [0.563] 
War * Other Ethnicity   0.594  0.445  0.442  0.449  0.455 
   [0.493]  [0.480]  [0.480]  [0.479]  [0.478] 
Nominal  -1.166  -1.16  -1.179  -1.192  - 
   [0.350]**  [0.350]**  [0.349]**  [0.347]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.12  0.116  0.094  -  - 
   [0.300]  [0.299]  [0.297]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.504  0.126  -  -  - 
   [0.271]+  [0.198]  -  -  - 
Constant  -3.605  -3.577  -3.554  -3.49  -3.668 
   [0.285]**  [0.287]**  [0.284]**  [0.197]**  [0.195]** 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Observations (Applications)  5,097  5,097  5,097  5,097  5,097 
Pseudo R-squared  0.034  0.032  0.031  0.031  0.02 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  Names are matched to ethnicities by 
a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  The category Jewish 
includes German Jewish applicants. During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one additional 
quarter of a membership which he could sell.  These applications are treated as four separate transactions since they 
involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.    4 
TABLE 4 – LOGIT REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH ANNUAL FIXED EFFECTS: COEFFICIENTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR REJECTED APPLICANTS, 0 FOR ACCEPTED 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
German   -0.747  -0.795  -0.796  -0.784  -0.752 
   [0.741]  [0.740]  [0.740]  [0.740]  [0.739] 
Jewish   0.761  0.722  0.721  0.749  0.831 
   [0.399]+  [0.397]+  [0.397]+  [0.396]+  [0.395]* 
Other Ethnicity   0.369  0.336  0.336  0.338  0.387 
   [0.324]  [0.323]  [0.323]  [0.323]  [0.322] 
Pre-war * German   1.615  1.371  1.37  1.356  1.379 
   [0.890]+  [0.872]  [0.872]  [0.871]  [0.871] 
Pre-war * Jewish   -0.267  -0.477  -0.477  -0.506  -0.561 
   [0.654]  [0.636]  [0.636]  [0.635]  [0.635] 
Pre-war * Other Ethnicity   -0.188  -0.326  -0.328  -0.331  -0.377 
   [0.478]  [0.461]  [0.461]  [0.461]  [0.460] 
War * German   1.98  1.786  1.789  1.763  1.776 
   [0.861]*  [0.852]*  [0.852]*  [0.850]*  [0.848]* 
War * Jewish   0.968  0.777  0.779  0.727  0.659 
   [0.578]+  [0.562]  [0.562]  [0.557]  [0.554] 
War * Other Ethnicity   0.489  0.348  0.348  0.333  0.31 
   [0.488]  [0.473]  [0.473]  [0.471]  [0.469] 
Nominal  -1.09  -1.091  -1.085  -1.125  - 
   [0.353]**  [0.353]**  [0.351]**  [0.349]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.376  0.371  0.376  -  - 
   [0.413]  [0.414]  [0.413]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.3  -0.041  -  -  - 
   [0.281]  [0.207]  -  -  - 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Groups (Years)  45  45  45  45  45 
Observations (Applications)  4,653  4,653  4,653  4,653  4,653 
Pseudo R-squared  0.034  0.031  0.031  0.031  0.019 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  Names are matched to ethnicities by 
a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  The category Jewish 
includes German Jewish applicants.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one additional 
quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These applications are treated as four separate 
transactions because they involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and 
** at 1 percent.    5 
TABLE 5 – LOGIT REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH TIME DUMMIES: COEFFICIENTS 
DISTINGUISHING GERMAN JEWISH FROM OTHER JEWISH NAMES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR REJECTED APPLICANTS, 0 FOR ACCEPTED 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
German   -0.723  -0.788  -0.786  -0.787  -0.757 
   [0.739]  [0.738]  [0.738]  [0.738]  [0.738] 
German Jewish   -0.994  -0.996  -0.996  -0.994  -0.927 
   [1.026]  [1.024]  [1.024]  [1.024]  [1.024] 
Other Jewish   1.515  1.454  1.452  1.459  1.573 
   [0.427]**  [0.425]**  [0.425]**  [0.424]**  [0.422]** 
Other Ethnicity   0.352  0.309  0.312  0.307  0.341 
   [0.324]  [0.322]  [0.322]  [0.321]  [0.321] 
Pre-war  0  0.096  0.109  0.061  0.157 
   [0.333]  [0.330]  [0.329]  [0.260]  [0.260] 
Pre-war * German   1.291  1.072  1.074  1.075  1.097 
   [0.876]  [0.865]  [0.865]  [0.865]  [0.864] 
Pre-war * German Jewish   0.706  0.743  0.752  0.749  0.712 
   [1.295]  [1.261]  [1.261]  [1.261]  [1.261] 
Pre-war * Other Jewish   -0.499  -0.891  -0.891  -0.899  -1.041 
   [0.759]  [0.749]  [0.749]  [0.749]  [0.747] 
Pre-war * Other Ethnicity   -0.139  -0.277  -0.275  -0.27  -0.306 
   [0.468]  [0.455]  [0.455]  [0.454]  [0.454] 
War  -0.145  -0.036  -0.019  -0.067  -0.035 
   [0.377]  [0.373]  [0.372]  [0.314]  [0.313] 
War * German   2.162  1.959  1.95  1.951  1.975 
   [0.861]*  [0.852]*  [0.852]*  [0.852]*  [0.851]* 
War * German Jewish   2.35  2.334  2.328  2.325  2.279 
   [1.157]*  [1.137]*  [1.137]*  [1.137]*  [1.136]* 
War * Other Jewish   0.906  0.445  0.441  0.434  0.306 
   [0.707]  [0.691]  [0.690]  [0.690]  [0.686] 
War * Other Ethnicity   0.595  0.447  0.444  0.449  0.455 
   [0.493]  [0.480]  [0.480]  [0.479]  [0.478] 
Nominal  -1.168  -1.158  -1.177  -1.186  - 
   [0.351]**  [0.351]**  [0.349]**  [0.347]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.093  0.094  0.071  -  - 
   [0.301]  [0.301]  [0.299]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.501  0.13  -  -  - 
   [0.271]+  [0.199]  -  -  - 
Constant  -3.587  -3.563  -3.539  -3.491  -3.668 
   [0.285]**  [0.286]**  [0.283]**  [0.198]**  [0.195]** 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Observations (Applications)  5,072  5,097  5,097  5,097  5,097 
Pseudo R-squared  0.044  0.038  0.038  0.038  0.027 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  As a first step, names are matched to 
ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  Then, German 
Jewish last names are identified based on the most frequent country of origin in the arrival records of ships that 
entered New York between 1850 and 1950.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one 
additional quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These applications are treated as four 
separate transactions because they involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 
percent, and ** at 1 percent.    6 
TABLE 6 – LOGIT REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH ANNUAL FIXED EFFECTS: COEFFICIENTS 
DISTINGUISHING GERMAN JEWISH AND OTHER JEWISH NAMES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS 1 FOR REJECTED APPLICANTS, 0 FOR ACCEPTED 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
German   -0.742  -0.789  -0.79  -0.78  -0.747 
   [0.741]  [0.740]  [0.740]  [0.740]  [0.739] 
German Jewish   -0.947  -0.934  -0.934  -0.928  -0.86 
   [1.027]  [1.025]  [1.025]  [1.025]  [1.024] 
Other Jewish   1.575  1.502  1.502  1.546  1.651 
   [0.433]**  [0.430]**  [0.430]**  [0.426]**  [0.425]** 
Other Ethnicity   0.37  0.34  0.34  0.342  0.392 
   [0.324]  [0.323]  [0.323]  [0.323]  [0.323] 
Pre-war * German   1.608  1.363  1.361  1.35  1.372 
   [0.890]+  [0.872]  [0.872]  [0.871]  [0.871] 
Pre-war * German Jewish   0.785  0.878  0.876  0.869  0.85 
   [1.305]  [1.268]  [1.268]  [1.268]  [1.268] 
Pre-war * Other Jewish   -0.627  -0.989  -0.988  -1.032  -1.135 
   [0.778]  [0.765]  [0.765]  [0.763]  [0.761] 
Pre-war * Other Ethnicity   -0.188  -0.33  -0.332  -0.334  -0.381 
   [0.478]  [0.461]  [0.461]  [0.461]  [0.460] 
War * German   1.968  1.775  1.778  1.757  1.767 
   [0.861]*  [0.852]*  [0.851]*  [0.850]*  [0.848]* 
War * German Jewish   2.073  2.095  2.096  2.075  2.033 
   [1.157]+  [1.137]+  [1.137]+  [1.136]+  [1.134]+ 
War * Other Jewish   0.913  0.58  0.582  0.508  0.389 
   [0.720]  [0.698]  [0.698]  [0.688]  [0.683] 
War * Other Ethnicity   0.484  0.342  0.341  0.328  0.302 
   [0.488]  [0.472]  [0.472]  [0.470]  [0.468] 
Nominal  -1.098  -1.095  -1.089  -1.121  - 
   [0.353]**  [0.353]**  [0.352]**  [0.349]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.274  0.294  0.3  -  - 
   [0.413]  [0.413]  [0.411]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  -0.742  -0.789  -0.79  -0.78  -0.747 
   [0.741]  [0.740]  [0.740]  [0.740]  [0.739] 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Groups (Years)  45  45  45  45  45 
Observations (Applications)  4,653  4,653  4,653  4,653  4,653 
Pseudo R-squared  0.046  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.028 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  As a first step, names are matched to 
ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  Then, German 
Jewish last names are identified based on the most frequent country of origin in the arrival records of ships that 
entered New York between 1850 and 1950.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one 
additional quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These applications are treated as four 
separate transactions because they involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 
percent, and ** at 1 percent.  
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TABLE 7 – OLS REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH TIME DUMMIES 
DISTINGUISHING GERMAN JEWISH AND OTHER JEWISH NAMES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS NUMBER OF BLACK BALLS (VOTES OPPOSING AN APPLICATION) 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
German   -0.083  -0.107  -0.106  -0.106  -0.096 
   [0.173]  [0.172]  [0.172]  [0.172]  [0.173] 
German Jewish   -0.312  -0.314  -0.314  -0.315  -0.293 
   [0.216]  [0.215]  [0.215]  [0.215]  [0.215] 
Other Jewish   0.772  0.734  0.733  0.732  0.772 
   [0.253]**  [0.252]**  [0.252]**  [0.252]**  [0.252]** 
Other Ethnicity   0.153  0.136  0.137  0.138  0.15 
   [0.116]  [0.116]  [0.116]  [0.115]  [0.115] 
Pre-War  -0.139  -0.109  -0.101  -0.096  -0.064 
   [0.109]  [0.108]  [0.108]  [0.087]  [0.087] 
Pre-War * German   0.36  0.272  0.273  0.273  0.284 
   [0.257]  [0.249]  [0.249]  [0.249]  [0.249] 
Pre-War * German Jewish   0.29  0.289  0.294  0.294  0.283 
   [0.331]  [0.316]  [0.316]  [0.316]  [0.317] 
Pre-War * Other Jewish   -0.072  -0.333  -0.333  -0.332  -0.381 
   [0.382]  [0.368]  [0.368]  [0.368]  [0.368] 
Pre-War * Other Ethnicity   -0.095  -0.149  -0.148  -0.149  -0.162 
   [0.166]  [0.162]  [0.162]  [0.161]  [0.162] 
War  -0.121  -0.09  -0.081  -0.077  -0.066 
   [0.119]  [0.118]  [0.118]  [0.100]  [0.100] 
War * German   0.81  0.739  0.735  0.735  0.745 
   [0.273]**  [0.269]**  [0.269]**  [0.269]**  [0.269]** 
War * German Jewish   0.814  0.802  0.798  0.799  0.785 
   [0.344]*  [0.338]*  [0.338]*  [0.338]*  [0.338]* 
War * Other Jewish   0.85  0.604  0.602  0.603  0.569 
   [0.446]+  [0.436]  [0.436]  [0.436]  [0.436] 
War * Other Ethnicity   0.149  0.099  0.097  0.096  0.097 
   [0.187]  [0.184]  [0.184]  [0.183]  [0.184] 
Nominal  -0.269  -0.27  -0.279  -0.278  - 
   [0.082]**  [0.082]**  [0.082]**  [0.080]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.002  0.005  -0.007  -  - 
   [0.101]  [0.101]  [0.100]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.213  0.078  -  -  - 
   [0.101]*  [0.077]  -  -  - 
Constant  0.433  0.437  0.451  0.447  0.383 
   [0.094]**  [0.094]**  [0.093]**  [0.066]**  [0.063]** 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Observations (Applications)  4,998  4,998  4,998  4,998  4,998 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange. Votes are by members of the 
NYSE’s Committee of Admissions; the Committee has 15 members and votes when at least 10 members are present. 
Black balls were recorded until 1936.  As a first step, names are matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that 
uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  Then, German Jewish last names are identified based on 
the most frequent country of origin in the arrival records of ships that entered New York between 1850 and 1950.  
During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing member received one additional quarter of a membership which he 
could sell to a new applicant.  These applications are treated as four separate transactions because they involve 
different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.    8 
TABLE 8 – OLS REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH ANNUAL FIXED EFFECTS 
DISTINGUISHING GERMAN JEWISH AND OTHER JEWISH NAMES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS NUMBER OF BLACK BALLS (VOTES OPPOSING AN APPLICATION) 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
German   -0.089  -0.114  -0.113  -0.106  -0.097 
   [0.173]  [0.172]  [0.172]  [0.172]  [0.172] 
German Jewish   -0.278  -0.278  -0.278  -0.274  -0.253 
   [0.215]  [0.214]  [0.214]  [0.214]  [0.214] 
Other Jewish   0.769  0.732  0.731  0.756  0.794 
   [0.252]**  [0.252]**  [0.252]**  [0.251]**  [0.251]** 
Other Ethnicity   0.169  0.154  0.155  0.156  0.174 
   [0.116]  [0.116]  [0.116]  [0.116]  [0.116] 
Pre-War * German   0.442  0.352  0.352  0.344  0.357 
   [0.257]+  [0.249]  [0.249]  [0.249]  [0.249] 
Pre-War * German Jewish   0.285  0.299  0.300  0.295  0.288 
   [0.331]  [0.316]  [0.316]  [0.316]  [0.316] 
Pre-War * Other Jewish   -0.092  -0.342  -0.342  -0.367  -0.411 
   [0.381]  [0.368]  [0.368]  [0.367]  [0.368] 
Pre-War * Other Ethnicity   -0.123  -0.171  -0.170  -0.172  -0.189 
   [0.166]  [0.162]  [0.162]  [0.162]  [0.162] 
War * German   0.738  0.665  0.664  0.650  0.657 
   [0.272]**  [0.268]*  [0.268]*  [0.268]*  [0.268]* 
War * German Jewish   0.699  0.696  0.695  0.683  0.669 
   [0.343]*  [0.337]*  [0.337]*  [0.337]*  [0.337]* 
War * Other Jewish   0.902  0.664  0.664  0.620  0.585 
   [0.446]*  [0.436]  [0.436]  [0.435]  [0.435] 
War * Other Ethnicity   0.105  0.059  0.059  0.052  0.046 
   [0.186]  [0.182]  [0.182]  [0.182]  [0.183] 
Nominal  -0.247  -0.246  -0.249  -0.267  - 
   [0.083]**  [0.083]**  [0.082]**  [0.081]**  - 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.204  0.208  0.206  -  - 
   [0.143]  [0.143]  [0.143]  -  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.144  0.019  -  -  - 
   [0.102]  [0.078]  -  -  - 
Constant  0.312  0.334  0.339  0.388  0.341 
  [0.057]**  [0.056]**  [0.053]**  [0.040]**  [0.038]** 
Committee Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Groups (Years)  54  54  54  54  54 
Observations (Applications)  4,998  4,998  4,998  4,998  4,998 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  Black balls are cast by the NYSE’s 
Committee of Admissions; the Committee has 15 members. Black balls were recorded until 1936.  As a first step, 
names are matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming 
practices.  Then, German Jewish last names are identified based on the most frequent country of origin in the arrival 
records of ships that entered New York between 1850 and 1950.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing 
member received one additional quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These applications 
are treated as four separate transactions because they involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 
percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.    9 
TABLE 9 – OLS REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH TIME DUMMIES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS LOG PRICE OF A SEAT IN YEAR 2000 US DOLLARS 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
German   0.012  0.013  0.013  0.009  0.007  -0.012 
  [0.048]  [0.048]  [0.045]  [0.044]  [0.045]  [0.048] 
Jewish   -0.064  -0.067  -0.061  -0.062  -0.061  -0.012 
  [0.046]  [0.046]  [0.043]  [0.042]  [0.043]  [0.046] 
Other Ethnicity   0.026  0.025  0.02  0.023  0.02  -0.029 
  [0.033]  [0.033]  [0.030]  [0.030]  [0.030]  [0.033] 
Pre-war  -0.978  -0.977  -0.977  -0.978  -0.989  -1.479 
  [0.029]**  [0.029]**  [0.029]**  [0.029]**  [0.029]**  [0.024]** 
Pre-war * German   0.108  0.106  0.102  0.091  0.087  0.106 
  [0.064]+  [0.064]  [0.064]  [0.062]  [0.062]  [0.067] 
Pre-war * Jewish   0.118  0.121  0.112  0.105  0.1  0.051 
  [0.065]+  [0.065]+  [0.065]+  [0.062]+  [0.062]  [0.067] 
Pre-war * Other Ethnicity 
   
0.014  0.014  0.014  0.021  0.019  0.068 
[0.042]  [0.042]  [0.042]  [0.041]  [0.041]  [0.045] 
War  -0.613  -0.612  -0.612  -0.613  -0.629  -1.119 
  [0.032]**  [0.032]**  [0.032]**  [0.032]**  [0.032]**  [0.029]** 
War * German   0.143  0.138  0.121  0.113  0.12  0.138 
  [0.073]+  [0.073]+  [0.070]+  [0.069]  [0.069]+  [0.075]+ 
War * Jewish   0.218  0.212  0.209  0.203  0.207  0.158 
  [0.072]**  [0.072]**  [0.072]**  [0.070]**  [0.070]**  [0.076]* 
War * Other Ethnicity 
   
0.015  0.012  0.012  0.019  0.022  0.071 
[0.048]  [0.048]  [0.048]  [0.047]  [0.047]  [0.051] 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.699  0.698  0.698  0.697  0.72  - 
  [0.027]**  [0.027]**  [0.027]**  [0.027]**  [0.027]**  - 
Committee of Admissions  -0.127  -0.129  -0.129  -0.127  -  - 
  [0.025]**  [0.025]**  [0.025]**  [0.019]**  -  - 
German Buyer and Seller *  
   War  
-0.127  -0.132  -  -  -  - 
[0.183]  [0.183]  -  -  -  - 
Rejected  -0.09  -  -  -  -  - 
  [0.045]*  -  -  -  -  - 
Constant  14.357  14.355  14.36  14.361  14.338  14.828 
  [0.028]**  [0.028]**  [0.025]**  [0.025]**  [0.025]**  [0.018]** 
Committee Ethnic. Interact.  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Same Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Observations (Applications)  4,210  4,210  4,210  4,210  4,210  4,210 
R-squared  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.66  0.6 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  Names are matched to ethnicities by 
a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  The category Jewish 
includes German Jewish names, following the original classification.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing 
member received one additional quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These applications 
are treated as four separate transactions because they involve different sellers and prices. + denotes significance at 10 
percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.    10 
 
TABLE 10 – OLS REGRESSIONS; 1883-1936, WITH ANNUAL FIXED EFFECTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS LOG PRICE OF A SEAT IN YEAR 2000 US DOLLARS 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
German   0.003  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.003 
  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.013] 
Jewish   -0.022  -0.022  -0.023  -0.025  -0.025  -0.018 
  [0.013]+  [0.013]+  [0.012]+  [0.012]*  [0.012]*  [0.012] 
Other Ethnicity   0.027  0.027  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025 
  [0.010]**  [0.010]**  [0.009]**  [0.009]**  [0.009]**  [0.009]** 
Pre-war * German   0.009  0.009  0.008  0.003  0.003  0.001 
  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.018] 
Pre-war * Jewish   0.036  0.035  0.035  0.026  0.026  0.02 
  [0.019]+  [0.019]+  [0.019]+  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.018] 
Pre-war * Other Ethnicity 
   
-0.017  -0.017  -0.017  -0.017  -0.017  -0.017 
[0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012] 
War * German   0.009  0.009  0.011  0.007  0.007  0.003 
  [0.021]  [0.021]  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.020] 
War * Jewish   0.066  0.066  0.066  0.058  0.058  0.047 
  [0.021]**  [0.021]**  [0.021]**  [0.020]**  [0.020]**  [0.020]* 
War * Other Ethnicity 
   
-0.016  -0.015  -0.016  -0.016  -0.016  -0.018 
[0.014]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.014] 
Quarter Dividend Sale  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  0.093  - 
  [0.011]**  [0.011]**  [0.011]**  [0.011]**  [0.011]**  - 
Committee of Admissions  0.005  0.006  0.005  0.001  -  - 
  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.006]  -  - 
German Buyer and Seller * 
     War 
0.017  0.017  -  -  -  - 
[0.053]  [0.053]  -  -  -  - 
Rejected  0.008  -  -  -  -  - 
  [0.013]  -  -  -  -  - 
Constant  13.939  13.939  13.941  13.942  13.943  13.964 
  [0.006]**  [0.006]**  [0.004]**  [0.004]**  [0.004]**  [0.003]** 
Committee Ethnicity 
   Interactions  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Same Ethnicity Interactions  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Groups (Years)  54  54  54  54  54  54 
Observations (Applications)  4,210  4,210  4,210  4,210  4,210  4,210 
Notes: Data were collected from the Archives at the New York Stock Exchange.  Names are matched to ethnicities by 
a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices.  The category Jewish 
includes German Jewish names, following the original classification.  During the Quarter Dividend Sale, each existing 
member received one additional quarter of a membership which he could sell to a new applicant.  These applications 
are treated as four separate transactions because they involved different sellers and prices.  Prices for these 
transactions are multiplied by a factor of four. + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.   1 




































Notes: Data on operas are collected from historical schedules of performances in the online archives of the 
Metropolitan Opera in New York.  German-language composers include Austrian and Bohemian composers. 
 
 

















Notes: Data are constructed by counting the number of children with the name Otto or Wilhelm born between 
1911 and 1919 and recorded in the United States Census of 1920.  To scale the series in one graph, the number 
of Ottos is multiplied by 10 and the number of Williams is divided by 20.     2 
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Notes: The ethnic composition is computed by adding buyers to the stock of existing members and subtracting 
sellers.  Buyers’ and sellers’ names are collected from the ledgers of transactions in the archives of the NYSE.  
Names are matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific 
naming practices. 
   3 
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Notes: Data on names and election outcomes are collected at the archives of the NYSE.  Names are matched to 
ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming practices. 
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Notes:  The Committee of Admissions had 15 members, whose names are drawn from the Minutes  of the 
Committee of Admissions (1904), Francis Eames (1894), and the New York Stock Exchange Directory.  
Members are matched to ethnicities by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific 
naming practices; this information was supplemented with information from obituaries in the New York Times 
























































Notes:  Names of expelled members are collected from annotations in the ledgers of transactions at the NYSE 
archives.  German and Jewish members are identified by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and 
location-specific naming practices.  German Jews are distinguished from other Jews using passenger lists of 

















































Notes:  Sellers’ names are collected from the ledgers of transactions at the NYSE archives.  German and Jewish 
members are identified by a commercial algorithm that uses linguistic rules and location-specific naming 
practices.  German Jews are distinguished from other Jews using passenger lists of immigrant ships that arrived 
at the port of New York between 1850 and 1950 (available at ancestry.com).  
 
 
 